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Abstract 
The paper discusses the nature of extralegal land transfers in an upgraded informal settlement in South Africa. 
The paper investigates these extralegal transfers in terms of the notion of property and property law as a social 
construct. The paper researches two main but contradictory conclusions, namely that either extralegal transfers 
are the result of the current social construct of property (also related to the historic lack of formal property for 
black people in South Africa) and / or that they are the result of the excessively high transaction costs of a formal 
transfer process. 
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Introduction 
The relationship between land tenure upgrading and economic development is a common 
theme in development discourse and a key element in housing policy discourse. The work of 
Hernando De Soto (2000) suggests that the lack of appropriate land tenure systems inhibits 
the release of the economic value of such property – which in turn is a crucial generator of 
wealth, especially in the West. The World Bank (1993)  also  proposes land titling, and 
emphasises the importance of such titling for the creation of a secondary market, in order to 
increase the tax revenue of cities and ensure security of tenure for further housing investment. 
Although De Soto’s work and the World  Bank’s ideas have been subjected to criticism 
(Gilbert, 2002; Royston, 2006; Campbell, 2013), very little work has been done in respect of 
longer-term evaluations of titling programmes, with most of the points of criticism being 
conceptually based. A recent special edition of Urban Forum focuses primarily on informal 
land markets in existing informal settlements (Kihato & Royston, 2013). However, longer-
term evaluations of site and services programmes are emerging, suggesting that a range of 
extralegal (informal) land transfers are taking place in areas that received titling through the 
World Bank and other funded site and services programmes during the 1970s and 1980s 
(Ward  et al.,  2011; Marais  &  Ntema, 2013).  One of the outcomes of these longer-term  
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evaluations is the queries concerning the legitimacy of the deeds register. In this regard, Peter 
Ward et al. (2011)  argue  “…that cities are experiencing a new wave of informality and 
property transfers which, if not fully understood, and if left unfettered, is likely to create 
further obstacles to home improvements and market performance. It is also likely to herald a 
new round of title regularization as property is sub-divided and inherited by second and third 
generation family members”. In the South African context, Lani Roux (2013: ii) points out 
that: “If buyers decide not to register transactions, significant implications arise; for buyers, 
who may be vulnerable to eviction by the previous owner or the state, and for the integrity of 
the registration system which does not reflect the actual ownership of parcels” while a number 
of other papers have also tried to reflect on informal land markets (Gunter & Scheepers, 
2012).  
The paper aims to assess the nature of extralegal transfers against the background of the 
policy imperatives and ideas of the World Bank, as well as De Soto’s thinking and the 
theoretical contributions from the field of economic sociology. The necessity for the research 
is reflected by Laura Royston’s (2006: 166) comment that “[w]e need much greater attention 
in South Africa to describing these extralegal processes….”. Essentially, we argue that these 
informal land tenure transfers reflect both social and economic attributes which complicate 
potential policy responses in this respect.  
 
Methods 
The paper developed from longitudinal research that we conducted in Freedom Square 
over a period of more than twenty years (Marais & Ntema, 2013). The research process over 
this period included four household surveys conducted in 1990, 1993, 1998 and 2008. One of 
the questions in the 2008 survey required the household respondents to indicate when they 
had settled in Freedom Square. Sixty-one of the 200 respondents indicated that they had 
settled there since 1995 (this date is important, as the initial settlement and upgrading 
programme was completed by 1994). At the same time, the deeds register information was 
obtained for Freedom Square. We then visited each stand in those cases where the respondent 
had indicated that the household had settled there since 1996, and compared the information 
with the available information from the deeds office. The outcomes of this survey suggested 
that of the 61 stands visited, 30 were indeed occupied by the original inhabitants. This can be 
attributed to the fact that in many cases, the 2008 questionnaire may have been completed by, 
for example, a spouse who was not present before 1995. In the remaining 31 cases, the current 
occupants did not correspond with the information on the deeds register. An original scan was 
conducted to determine the reason for the differences. Four main informal land transfer 
processes were identified during this process, namely transfers from parents to children (x 18) 
(no financial transaction), stand swopping (x three) (no financial transaction), the appointment 
of a caretaker to the stand (x one) (no financial transaction), and finally, transfers which 
included a financial transaction (informal selling of the housing unit) (x nine). Semi-
structured interviews were drafted to fit each of these transaction types. Essentially, we based 
some of our methods on existing network theory – something not unfamiliar to economic 
sociology (Swedberg, 1997) – in order to understand the nature of the networks embedded in 
these transactions. However, in contrast to most of the network theory studies, we employed a 
qualitative research method. We conducted five semi-structured interviews with respondents 
from households where inheritance had come into play; three interviews in cases where land-
swopping arrangements had been made; and four interviews with respondents who had 
engaged in a financial transaction. These interviews were conducted with the people currently 
living on the stands (as identified by the household). We indicated the various interviewees in 
the discussion section. 
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De Soto and economic sociology: a different perspective 
De Soto’s ideas and the policy context 
The plight of low-income earners attempting to access urban housing and security of 
tenure in India, Latin America and Africa is well documented (Durand-Lasserve & Royston, 
2002). Although self-help housing has long been common practice in the developing world, 
especially in Latin America (Harris, 1998), the concept of land titling rose to prominence 
following the acceptance of site and services schemes by the World Bank in the early 1970s 
(World Bank, 1993) and the publication of John Turner’s book Housing by People (1976), 
which emphasised security of tenure as a prerequisite for informal settlement upgrading. The 
initial World Bank land titling programmes were based on the principles of affordability, cost 
recovery and replicability. The underlying aims of these programmes were to create a 
secondary urban housing market, ensure a basis for revenue creation and provide a platform 
for housing investment.  
  During the mid-1980s, World Bank housing policy approaches shifted their focus to the 
relationship between macroeconomic reforms and housing policy. This was a time of 
worldwide structural adjustment programmes that emphasised the importance of the housing 
sector within the economy. The early 1990s also saw the introduction of whole-sector housing 
development, which emphasised urban upgrading (as opposed to site and service schemes), 
infrastructure improvement, financial market development, regulatory reform and the 
formalisation of tenure arrangements (World Bank, 1993). The importance of land titling was 
pointed out by the World Bank (1993: 117) in the following words: “The registration of 
property rights in squatter settlements is ... important in making land and house transactions 
possible and giving occupants legal protection. It encourages the buying and selling of 
housing and makes it possible for households to move to a dwelling that suits their needs and 
their budgets. It also increases the choice of tenure available to households, allowing them to 
own or rent as they see fit”. These hoped-for outcomes would also allow governments to 
institute a system for the collection of property taxes, which in turn would generate funding 
for new urban development.  
  Similarly to the World Bank approach, De Soto’s (2000) publication, The Mystery of 
Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else,  stresses the 
importance of land titling in housing policy. Three points should be made about De Soto’s 
work. First, he argues that the biggest stumbling block preventing poor countries from 
developing is the lack of land titling, which if put in place would release credit markets, 
thereby fast-tracking growth. Second, De Soto suggests that existing informal settlements 
(and the informal economy as a whole) are largely the result of inappropriate planning and 
tenure regulation in the formal sector. De Soto states that the simplistic answer  lies in 
deregulation and the formalisation of tenure through ownership. These two solutions will 
result in the poor being incorporated into the formal economy. The third important element in 
De Soto’s work (one which is commonly ignored by his critics) is his contextualisation of 
property law as a social construct. He argues (thereby contradicting his promotion of 
ownership, to some degree) that land titling systems around the world are – and should be – 
the result of the social construct of land tenure.  
  De Soto’s ideas have been criticised by numerous authors (Gilbert, 1999; Royston, 2006; 
Campbell, 2013; Shaw, 2013). For example, Allan  Gilbert (2002) questioned whether 
mortgage lenders would be willing to lend money to poor people, and whether low-income 
households would actually want to borrow money. From a developmental point of view, De 
Soto’s ideas have been criticised because he singles out one factor (land titling) as a recipe for 
development, while disregarding a multiplicity of other factors (Campbell, 2013). Gilbert 
(2002) also argues that most informal dwellers have secure tenure, or at least experience 
secure tenure – and that land titling plays a marginal role in ensuring security of tenure.  
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Furthermore, the overall mobility of low-income residents in Latin American cities remains 
limited (Gilbert, 1999; Ward, et al., 2011), which minimises the demand for a secondary 
market.  Existing criticism also included  the assumption that poor people would want to 
borrow from banks to finance their housing (Gilbert, 2002); the assumed linear development 
path based on the Anglo-American model (Campbell, 2013); and the further assumption that 
banks would willingly lend money to poor people. However, De Soto’s notion of property 
and property law as a social construct has largely been ignored. At the same time, the other 
values of land ownership, such as the psychological value (Gunter, 2013), should not be 
ignored. 
 
De Soto and economic sociology 
  Neil  Smelser and Richard  Swedberg  (2005: 7)  argue that economic sociology has a 
tradition which “combine[s] the analysis of economic interests with the analysis of social 
relations”. It is not our intention to provide a thorough review of the current thinking in 
respect of economic sociology; but a few introductory comments are required. In general, De 
Soto’s ideas are either hailed or criticised on the basis of the role of tenure in creating 
secondary markets and releasing dead capital. However, very little reference is made to the 
fact that De Soto acknowledges that property law is fundamentally built on social values, and 
that property per se is a social construct. In this respect, De Soto (2000: 156-157) writes that: 
“Creating one national social contract on property involves understanding the psychological 
and social processes – the beliefs, desires, intentions, customs and rules – that are contained 
in these local social contracts and then using the tools that professional law provides to weave 
them into one formal national social contract”. He adds: “Extralegal social contracts on 
property underpin nearly all property systems… even in today’s United States” (De Soto, 
2000: 157). In fact, De Soto (2000) argues that in many cases, extralegal contracts portray the 
actual consensus about how property rights should be managed in an effective manner and 
that many titling programmes which do not refer to social contracts are destined to fail. 
Although the concept of law is underdeveloped (Edelman and Stryker, 2005) in economic 
sociology, many of De Soto’s ideas do, in fact, fall well within a sociological approach to 
law. In essence, such an approach to law accepts that “both law and economy are deeply 
embedded in social action…” (Edelman & Stryker, 2005:. 527). 
  The theoretical contribution from cultural sociology is mainly derived from the work of 
Vivianna Zelizer (1988). In its critique of purely economic models of markets, Zelizer’s work 
is embedded in the ‘multiple markets model’ which accepts neither economic nor cultural 
determinism in respect of market studies (Zelizer, 1988). Zelizer (1988: 619) states that “… 
economic phenomena, although partly autonomous, are interdependent with a system of 
meanings and structures in social relations”, while at the same time it should be 
acknowledged that new economic sociology studies emphasise the importance of market 
processes. Against this background, Zelizer (1988: 631) argues that “…[w]e should therefore 
aim towards an interactive economic model that will explore and explain the complex 
historical, cultural and social structural variability of economic life”. In this context, Fred 
Block (1994: 692) is of the opinion that ‘high marketness’ means “… that there is nothing to 
interfere with the dominance of price considerations, but as one moves down the continuum 
to lower levels of marketness, non-price considerations take on greater importance”.  
  One of the key concepts in institutional economics is the notion of transaction costs. In 
this respect, Ronald Coase (1988: 15) wrote that: “In order to carry out a market transaction it 
is necessary to discover who it is that one wishes to deal with and on what terms, to conduct 
negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up a contract, to undertake the inspection needed 
to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, and so on. These operations are 
often extremely costly, sufficiently costly at any rate to prevent many transactions that would  
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be carried out in a world in which the pricing system worked without cost”. Within this 
context, the informal economy represents a good example in terms of which the social 
underpinnings of economic transactions can be explained, and it provides a platform to 
investigate the ambiguous relationship with state regulations (Portes & Hall, 2005). Edgar 
Feige (1990: 992) argues that the informal sector represents a spectrum of activities ranging 
from transactions that are more or less illegal, to unreported and unrecorded economic 
activity, and to economic activities “… that bypass the cost of, and are excluded from the 
protection of, laws and administrative rules covering property relationships, commercial 
licensing, labour contracts, torts, financial credit and social security systems”. In addition, 
Portes and Hall (2005: 407) are of the opinion that embeddedness, as conceptualised by Mark 
Granovetter, is “… nowhere clearer than in transactions where the only resource against 
malfeasance is mutual trust”. Violating this mutual trust can lead to exclusion from future 
transactions. Portes and Hall (2005) argue that the main paradox in relation to the informal 
economy pertains to the fact that the more it strives towards the formal economy, the more it 
depends on social networks for its functioning. The work of Granovetter (1985: 487) with 
regard to ‘embeddedness’, by which he meant that economic actions are “…embedded in 
concrete, ongoing systems of social relations”, also requires some attention, along with the 
role of social networks. In essence, network studies have focused on the role of social 
networks in economic transactions. In fact, the body of knowledge makes a distinction 
between strong and weak ties, and emphasises the role of weak ties in a range of economic 
activities.  
 
South African land history 
  South Africa has had a long history of land titling, with the former African reserves (later 
to become homeland areas under apartheid rule) comprising the exception in this respect. The 
upgrading of informal settlements since the early 1990s and the subsequent housing policy in 
a post-apartheid dispensation were largely (but not exclusively) dominated by home-
ownership. Land tenure arrangements for black people changed over the years, and varied 
from traditional tenure arrangements in African reserves to a range of tenure options in black 
suburbs near large towns and cities. However, in general, home-ownership for blacks in urban 
South  Africa was only legalised as from the mid-1980s (despite some forms of home-
ownership being available between the two world wars). The emphasis on ownership in the 
post-apartheid period was multi-faceted and included the need to release the state from the 
burden of its properties, placing the responsibility on the individual and addressing the 
negative consequences of apartheid planning by providing black South Africans with access 
to home-ownership outside of the original African reserves in the homelands. At the same 
time, a private-sector-sponsored NGO, the Urban Foundation, started to fund some informal 
settlement upgrading programmes at the end of the 1980s; and the Independent Development 
Trust funded such projects in the political transition between 1990 and 1994 (Huchzermeyer, 
2004). The Independent Development Trust funded approximately 100,000 stands in terms of 
a site and services scheme, providing ownership and basic services to these households. The 
basic constituents of this policy were retained in post-apartheid housing policy, with the main 
difference being the addition of a core house. A number of studies have considered evaluating 
satisfaction levels of new housing delivery product (Moolla, Kotze & Block, 2011; Ntema 
and Marais, 2013) but less have considered more detail reflections on what ownership means 
and how it is traded. 
 
Informal land transfers 
  The history of Freedom Square is discussed elsewhere (Marais & Krige, 1997; Marais & 
Ntema, 2013),  and  only a brief overview is provided  here.  Freedom Square,  near  
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Bloemfontein,  was one of the largest projects financed (4,000 stands) from the funding 
provided by the Independent Development Trust between 1990 and 1994 (Marais & Krige, 
1997). The land was originally invaded as a typical informal settlement at the beginning of 
1990. Between 1992 and 1994, an informal settlement upgrading programme funded by the 
Independent Development Trust provided ownership, water and waterborne sanitation on 
individual stands and also electricity access (Marais and Krige, 1997). Between 1996 and 
1999, the consolidation subsidy was used to provide a two-room house to all the households 
(Marais, Van Rensburg & Botes, 2003). Since the transformation of local government in 
1995, the area was formally included in the local government’s domain of service delivery. In 
the remainder of the section, three forms of extralegal transfer are discussed. This is followed 
by a number of observations on such transactions. 
 
Stand swopping 
  We were able to conduct interviews with three individuals in cases where stand swopping 
had taken place. In all three cases, some kind of family problem had played a crucial role that 
culminated in the stand swopping, while crime had also played a role. Furthermore, in all 
three cases, the stand swopping had been facilitated by a third person – mostly through weak 
ties (neighbours / friends). Interestingly enough, the new owners had all invested in their 
swopped land / houses (up to R30,000) – a factor that may indicate a perception of security of 
tenure on their part. Furthermore, all of the parties concerned were aware that the stands had 
not been formally transferred, and some had even made an attempt to involve attorneys in this 
respect. In one case, the transfer process was complicated by the fact that the original owner 
had bought the site through informal mechanisms from someone else prior to the stand-
swopping arrangement. In two cases, an agreement had been reached that the transfer of title 
would take place at some stage, while agreements had also been entered into in respect of the 
payment of the various water bills.  
 
Inheritance 
  The international experiences have revealed the complexities that arise when inheritance 
is not recorded in the deeds registers (Ward et al., 2011). South Africa is no exception in this 
respect.  Respondents generally reported that a family meeting had been held in order to 
decide or confirm who would inherit the house (x five). This was a mere pragmatic decision 
based on the question as to which person was most in need of a house (strong ties). In two 
cases, the deceased, prior to his or her demise, had stipulated who should take ownership of 
the property after his or her death – usually someone very close to the deceased (strong ties). 
In neither of these two cases was written documentation available to corroborate the transfer 
of ownership; and all involved were trusted to comply with the wishes of the deceased. The 
five cases of inheritance varied in type between parent/s-to-child (x three), sister-to-sister (x 
one), and grandmother-to-grandchild (x one) inheritance – mostly involving strong ties. The 
grandmother-to-grandchild ‘transfer’ reflected an extremely ‘strong tie’, as the grandmother 
had taken care of the grandchild from a very young age, while the current  owner (the 
grandchild) had gratefully returned the favour when her grandmother grew older. In the words 
of the grandchild (current owner): “I looked after her and made sure that she did not struggle 
with anything” (Interview One – inheritance).  
  In one case the current owner argued that in addition to some of the factors above, he had 
inherited the house because he was the eldest boy in the family. The respondent stated: “Since 
I am the only boy in the family, it was then decided by the family and relatives after the 
funeral that I should take over from my parents”  (Interview Two –  inheritance). Thus, 
although in the majority of cases proximity to the deceased and the need within the family 
played a decisive role, cultural factors cannot be excluded in this respect.  
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  When the respondents were asked what proof the current owners could produce to 
confirm that the property belonged to them, a number of answers came to the fore. One 
respondent articulated her answer in the following words: “The only proof I have is that her 
children, my uncles, aunts and other relatives who were there in the meeting that was called 
by my grandmother shortly before she died, all could bear … witness that she told them this 
house [would] be mine” (Interview Four inheretance). Two respondents acknowledged that 
they had no proof, while the remaining two respondents argued that they had lodged a process 
with the Justice Department. One respondent argued as follows: “I do not have proof, except 
the photocopies I got from the master of [the] high court that [indicate] that I have applied for 
change of ownership” (Interview three – inheritance). The latter quote also suggests that the 
new owner does not understand the process, since the master of the High Court might only 
have ratified the inheritance, but not the transfer, of the property. 
  Transferring of land to the current owner seemed to be difficult for a number of reasons. It 
seems as if historical extralegal transfers, transfer costs, the outstanding water bills (a 
municipal regulation requires all utilities to be paid for, prior to any land transfer process), the 
legal process required to confirm the inheritance and the wrong perception in respect of who 
is responsible for transfers, all played a crucial role in the five case studies. The narrative of 
one of the respondents best summarises this array of processes: “I first went to the 
municipality and requested that they assist me with change of ownership and was told that I 
would have to pay an amount of money which at that time I did not have since I was 
unemployed. They requested me to draw up an affidavit, which I did. [I] submitted [it] to 
them, but to date nothing has happened on their part. I also went to lawyers, Home Affairs 
and [the] City Hall but was never helped. Thereafter I went to the Department of Justice and 
was issued with [a] letter of authority by the magistrate which stated that I have inherited the 
property my parents left … me. I did all these [things] all by myself not knowing anyone in 
these institutions” (Interview Five – inheritance). In one case, the grandchild expected the 
children of the deceased to make the transfer. The uncertainty with regard to the process to be 
followed and the related transaction costs associated with the transfers can best be described 
in terms of the following comment from one of the respondents: “… I could not afford the 
money that was asked by the municipality to settle the arrears my parents incurred on their 
water bill. This was a condition before they could help me with transfer of ownership. 
Because they [were sending] me from pillar to post, I ended up giving up – I just could not 
afford the travelling costs, let alone the amount they were asking to settle the water bill” 
(Interview One – inheritance).  
  In one of the five cases, the lack of security of tenure played a role in inhibiting the new 
owner from investing in the house. The respondent stated that she was keen to invest, but was 
somewhat uncertain about such an investment, as the stand had not been formally transferred.  
 
Financial transactions 
  We were able to complete four interviews in this category. The first transaction involved 
an estate agent, and was initiated when the original owner (who was a client at the current 
owner’s shebeen) expressed his desire to sell his unit. The current ‘owner’ (who resided in an 
informal housing unit adjacent to Freedom Square and managed a shebeen) was interested in 
buying the unit. She expected the original owner to arrange a meeting with her to discuss the 
transaction. However, one morning she saw the vehicle of an estate agent outside the original 
owner’s house. The current owner confronted the original owner about his commitment to 
liaise with her with regard to his intention to sell the house. The original owner, according to 
the current owner, contacted the estate agent because “he was afraid that maybe we were not 
going to agree on certain issues, particularly the price” (Interview one – financial transaction). 
Thus, to some degree, the original owner wished to make use of the services of a professional  
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person, in order to minimise his risks and to set the rules for the transaction. Furthermore, the 
actual negotiations took place between the new owner and the son of the original owner. It 
should also be noted that the estate agent intended to upgrade the house (by plastering it and 
carrying out crucial repairs) in order to increase the price. The current owner went to see the 
estate agent and they agreed on a selling price of R28,000 (without any repairs). The original 
offer was R25,000, but the estate agent pushed the price up by stating that the purchase price 
should also include transfer costs of R3,000. Furthermore, it should be noted that the original 
owner’s son negotiated on behalf of his father. Contrary to normal legal practice, the purchase 
amount was paid to the estate agent and not to a lawyer (conveyancer). The current owner 
paid the first R25,500 in cash and the remaining R2,500 in monthly installments to the estate 
agent over a period of two years – no interest was charged. The new owner raised the original 
R25,500 by means of a donation provided by her brother. She was also told by the estate 
agent that the deposit slip comprised proof of the purchase and new ownership of the 
property. Four main problems remained in respect of this transaction. First, the actual deeds 
transfer had not taken place, despite numerous attempts by the current owner to accelerate the 
process. Secondly, the outstanding water and electricity account from the local authority had 
not been paid (such payment is a legal prerequisite which must be fulfilled before a lawyer 
can convey the property), despite a commitment made by the original owner at the time of 
selling the property. Thirdly, the incorrect details on the identity document of the spouse of 
the original owner (which did not correspond with the details in the deeds register) were also 
delaying the process. Fourthly, the current owner’s husband passed away during 2012, 
complicating the incomplete transaction even further. The current owner was so frustrated 
that she declared her willingness to appear on the ‘Speak Out’ programme on television, in 
order to state her case against the attorney and the estate agent, because – in her own words – 
“I don’t understand what [has been taking] them so long to process the transaction since 
2010” (Interview One – financial transaction). Her frustration was further exacerbated by the 
estate agent’s failure to take her calls. 
  The second financial transaction came about through the fact that the previous owner had 
‘inherited’ the house from his parents (this inheritance was also not recorded on the deeds 
register). He was residing in another town, Petrusburg, approximately 80km from 
Bloemfontein. He initially rented the house out to the current owner (who had a long history 
of renting housing in the area), although the current owner did not know the original owner, 
since the rental payments and agreements had been arranged with a third party. At some stage 
during this rental agreement, the original owner had contacted the current owner directly, 
stating that he had some personal problems and wished to sell the house. Interestingly 
enough, the new owner had requested the original owner to reconsider his intention: “I first 
asked him to go and think about what he was telling me… [about wanting to sell the house]” 
because “… people should not blame me tomorrow and claim that I have robbed him [by 
buying the house,] since he was still a young man” (Interview Two – financial transaction). 
The possible transaction was also discussed in detail between the current owner, his wife and 
his mother-in-law. They eventually agreed on a sale price of R15,000. The original owner and 
the current owner decided to agree on a monthly instalment (without interest). This was paid 
on a monthly basis to the lady who had originally managed the lease agreement. However, 
after paying R9,000, the new owner stopped making payments, for two reasons. First, the lady 
who collected the money died. Secondly, transfer had not taken place. The current owner 
decided that he would pay the outstanding R6,000 when a formal transfer had been realised. It 
is noteworthy that this lack of payment did not elicit any reaction from the original owner. 
Contractually, an affidavit was signed at a police station. It is also noteworthy that the 
affidavit was signed as a family gift from the original owner – a gift from one cousin to 
another – which was a deliberate lie to avoid potential problems in relation to the eight-year  
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restriction on selling a government-subsidised house (Housing Amendment Act, 2001). The 
current owner described the discussion with the original owner that had taken place in this 
regard. The original owner apparently had said: “Although you and I know that our agreement 
is about the sale of the house, we should in an affidavit state it as a free of charge transaction 
[sic] to you [as] my cousin” (Interview Two – financial transaction). An affidavit to this effect 
was accordingly signed. A number of comments should be made with regard to this 
transaction, and more specifically with regard to the lack of transfer of the title. First, in an 
attempt to formalise the process, the current owner went to the municipality in order to 
attempt to change the account details. The municipality requested him to procure the death 
certificates of the original owner’s parents, as well as the identification document  of the 
person who had inherited the house. Secondly, the new owner was unable to obtain access to 
these documents; and he claimed that the original owner was avoiding him: “I would always 
hear from his friends and other people who know him that he would usually come to 
Bloemfontein and not bother to come and see me despite being told by these people that I am 
desperately looking for him, so he is giving me a ‘run around’  now”  (Interview Two – 
financial transactions). Thirdly, there seems to have been conflict about the transaction, in that 
the brother of the original owner disputed the latter’s authority to sell a house ‘inherited’ from 
their parents.  
  The third transaction was the result of a parent’s efforts to find accommodation for his 
child, who had come to Bloemfontein to further her education. The new owner was employed 
in Kimberley as a mineworker. He had first rented a house for his daughter; but she had been 
informed by an acquaintance (‘weak tie’) of someone whose house was for sale (not far from 
the place that her father was renting for her). She contacted her father who resided in 
Kimberley; and an appointment was made with the prospective seller. An agreement was 
reached on a sale price of R15,000 and an affidavit to that effect was signed at a police 
station. The new owner expressed the value of owning the house in the following words: “… I 
used to spend a lot of money on renting, and [in the event of] a slight delay in monthly 
payment they would usually kick her out” (Interview Three – Financial Transaction). After an 
initial deposit of R2,000 had been made, the payment process occurred by means of monthly 
installments of R500. The new owner claims that an affidavit was signed at the police station 
and that the monthly installments were also paid there. The new owner reflected on this 
situation as follows: “We agreed and then went to the police station to make sure [that] we 
[went] to the law enforcement agents [to] sign the agreement in their presence” (Interview 
Three – financial transaction). They also agreed to go back to the police station after full 
payment (which they duly did), to “… officially transfer the house into my name” (Interview 
Three – financial transaction). The new owner is under the impression that ownership was 
transferred to him via the police. He stated that his child told him that “… the signed 
certificate from the Police Station was issued, and given to her, [thereby  transferring] 
ownership to me” (Interview Three – financial transaction). Consequently, the new owner is 
under the impression that the stand is now legally his. 
  The fourth transaction goes back as far as 1996/1997, just after the original erf had been 
formalised through the IDT scheme. The current owner heard, through a distant friend of her 
husband, about someone who wanted to sell their home. The price agreed on was R1,500, 
which included the serviced stand and an informal dwelling on the stand. An initial ‘deposit’ 
of R750 (funded through the new owner’s membership of a savings society) was required; 
and an agreement was reached on how the remainder would be paid. It is interesting to note 
that this transaction was facilitated by a colleague of the new owner’s husband. In fact, this 
person played a crucial role in ensuring trust between the new owner and the original owner. 
The new owner confirmed this in the following comment about the facilitator: “And he [the 
facilitator] told her that he knew my husband from work and that he [wouldn’t] do anything  
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dishonest, she should trust us” (Interview Four – financial transaction). An informal contract 
was drawn up with the husband of the new owner, with the facilitator acting as a witness for 
the transaction. The new owner estimated her investment, since taking over the stand, at 
approximately R80,000 – money originating from savings that she and her husband had put 
aside when they were still employed. There seems to have been some conflict about this 
transaction at some stage, as the children of the original owner indicated that they wanted 
their mother’s site back (she had passed away in the meantime), and that they would, in fact, 
refund the R1,500 that the new owner had originally paid. The current owner described her 
reaction in the following words: “I told them that they should ensure that they put wheels 
[onto] my house and move it to another site, [which] they would have to organize for me” 
(Interview Four – financial transaction). The new owner has not heard from the children since 
then (three years ago). The new owner also attempted to get the transfer processed via an 
attorney, but without success. She expressed her frustration in the following words: “[W]e 
paid him the requested amount and [it was] later [claimed] that our papers [had been] lost; and 
since then he [has given] us the ‘run around’” (Interview Four – financial transactions). A 
complaint to the small claims court did not render the desired results; and the necessary 
process was initiated with a second attorney. This process also ended in a deadlock, with the 
end result being that the property was not transferred legally. It seems as if the debt related to 
the water account is the main reason why ownership cannot be transferred. In the words of the 
new owner: “… I no longer trust anyone when it comes to transfer of property ownership. So 
I do not trust anybody, even the deeds office […] I do not trust them” (Interview Four – 
financial transactions).  
 
Synthesis 
  A number of observations should be made about these transactions. First, in two of the 
transactions, the purchasing price for a serviced stand and a two-room house was R15,000. 
This is equal to the original investment by the state through the housing subsidy programme 
(R7,500 for the site and services and R7,500 for the consolidation housing subsidy (Marais & 
Ntema, 2013). One of the stands was sold (before the housing subsidy was provided) for 
R1,500  – a considerably lower amount than the investment of R7,500. The fourth house 
fetched a price of R25,000, in the one instance where an estate agent played a role. If inflation 
is taken into account, the amounts are all lower than the original investment by the state 
subsidy programme.  
  Secondly, a number of observations should be made in respect of the financing of the 
initial transaction. In three of the four cases, a deposit was required, with some percentage of 
the purchasing sum to be paid off in installments over a period of time. The deposit amount 
varied from nearly 90% in one transaction (initiated by the estate agent) to about 13% 
(excluding the transaction which did not require a deposit). It should also be noted that no 
interest was charged in respect of the outstanding amounts that were paid in installments. In 
all four cases, houses were financed partially or fully through the buyers’ own contributions 
from their salaries, or through an advance on their salaries. In one case, a family relation 
provided the largest part of the original purchase amount, while belonging to a savings society 
was instrumental in paying a deposit in one case (although this only involved a small amount 
of R750, in 1996). It is noteworthy that no formal or informal credit mechanisms were utilised 
in any of the cases, while formal mortgage financing was also absent (as one would expect).  
  Thirdly, in one of the cases, the installment process of payment (after a deposit had been 
made) was used as a mechanism to keep the original owners to the agreement in respect of the 
transfer of the property. In fact, one of the new owners stopped paying the installments 
because transfer of property had not yet taken place.   
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  Fourthly, in three of the four cases, the financial transactions were conducted directly 
between the original owner and the new owner, although the payment of installments was 
sometimes conducted through a third party. In one case, an estate agent acted as the third 
party in initiating the process. In this case, the money was paid to the estate agent (in contrast 
to formal transactions, where the money is paid to an attorney). Third parties (usually weak 
ties) also played a role in ensuring trust in the transaction and collecting the monthly 
installments in two of the cases (including the transaction facilitated by the estate agent). 
  Fifthly, the nature of the contracts needs further elaboration. In two cases, an affidavit was 
signed at a police station. In fact, in one of these cases, the new owner is under the impression 
that the police station also issued a legal title deed. The third transaction was effectuated by 
means of a signed agreement between the two parties. In the fourth case, in which the estate 
agent was involved, no ‘contract/agreement’ was signed. In fact, the estate agent told the 
buyer to keep the proof of payment as proof of the agreement. Thus, the involvement of a 
professional service provider did not improve legal security – in fact, this might well be the 
transaction with the least security.  
  Sixthly, in one of the cases, a deliberate attempt had been made to hide the fact that the 
transaction was indeed a financial transaction. The affidavit signed at the police station 
indicated that the transaction entailed a transfer between two family members (cousins), with 
no costs involved. This was incorrect, in that the parties were not related, and an amount of 
R15,000, as agreed on between the parties, was paid for the site. This can most likely be 
regarded as a response to the government regulation preventing home-owners from selling 
their units during the first eight years, and also as an indication of how the informal market 
sidesteps government regulations.  
  Seventhly, some comments are warranted in respect of the understanding of the role of the 
deeds office and the reliability of the information on the title deeds. In two of the four cases, 
the existing information on the title deeds was incorrect. Either a spouse’s name was spelled 
incorrectly, or the South African ID number of one of the original owners was incorrect. 
Furthermore, two respondents did not know that such an office existed. The other two 
respondents expressed negative perceptions regarding the Deeds Office. One of the new 
owners remarked: “Eish! Deeds office next to SARS?”  (Interview Two –  financial 
transaction). 
  Furthermore, it should be noted that in all four cases, the new owners had invested heavily 
in their new housing. The relevant amounts ranged from R5,000 and R15,000 to substantial 
amounts of R80,000 and R160,000. The funding for these housing units varied from 
retirement benefits and savings made from salaries  received while working, to money 
obtained through lottery winnings. Nobody borrowed money to fund their housing 
expansions. Although the sample is small, it suggests that the current owners experience a 
significant degree of tenure security, inducing them to upgrade and invest in their housing 
units.  
  The role of professionals should also be discussed in more detail. Only one of the 
transactions had a formal estate agent in place. The estate agent provided some security for 
the original owner in the transaction, as the latter did not wish to deal directly with the buyer. 
It should also be noted that the highest price was obtained in the transaction in which an estate 
agent was involved. There is also an example of an ‘informal estate agent’ – a colleague of 
the husband of one of the new owners – who had vouched for the trustworthiness of the new 
owners (a weak tie). The colleague was not paid anything for his assistance. The role of 
attorneys seems to have been ambiguous, in the sense that even where attorneys were 
involved, land transfers still did not take place.  
  Arrears on the municipal account were a common reason why transfers had not taken 
place. The arrears mostly involved water accounts, as electricity provision is based on a pre- 
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paid system, while owners in the area do not pay land tax. It is the responsibility of the 
original owner to ensure that the water fees are paid prior to the finalisation of the agreement. 
The frustration of one of the new owners was expressed in the following words: “[T]hey (the 
previous owner) promised to pay arrears that the original owner incurred on his water 
account, but to date nothing [has been] paid as I continue to receive the monthly bill with [a] 
huge debt that I have inherited from the original owner”  (Interview  Three  –  financial 
transaction).  
 
Conclusion 
  This paper investigated the nature of extralegal transfers against the policy notion of 
emphasising land titling for low-income inhabitants and the theoretical underpinnings in 
economic sociology. De Soto’s argument pertaining to property as a social construct and his 
assertion that property legislation should be based on the social construct of property came 
under scrutiny in the paper. The results are mixed, with the following main points that should 
be highlighted. First, the processes of extralegal transfers suggest that titling and the required 
processes thereof are unfamiliar to the inhabitants of the area. Virtually none of the new 
owners have a history of formal property transfer. This is not strange, in view of the exclusion 
of black people from home ownership under apartheid. Considering De Soto’s argument, as 
well as the arguments encountered in economic sociology, the question can thus be asked as 
to whether these extralegal transfers do not suggest that the current property rights are 
inappropriate for the social construct of property by the residents. It is not easy to arrive at an 
answer to this question, as in many cases, the new owners were in actual fact endeavouring to 
ensure transfer, but were hindered by the administrative processes, the inability to find 
professional people to assist them effectively, and the requirements and costs involved in 
ensuring transfer. Essentially, the question is whether the failure to effectuate legal transfers is 
attributable to a specific social construct of property (or the lack of a cultural history in this 
respect), or to the complex and expensive transaction costs that are involved, or to the 
exploitation of the poor by professional persons in the process. Secondly, most of those 
involved required some form of security in the transactions/extralegal transfers. This ranged 
from signed affidavits to simply requiring the trust of people (family meeting). However, 
despite these mechanisms, final security of tenure has not been achieved. Finally, irrespective 
of the answers to these questions, it seems evident that the processes initiated to transform 
informality to formality have merely generated a new form of informality – a factor regarding 
which we still know very little. Stated differently, the process of tenure formalisation that is 
commonly viewed as the development path has generated a new type of informality. 
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